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Abstract
We present a new paper-based voting method with in-
teresting security properties. The attempt here is to
see if one can achieve the same security properties of
recently proposed cryptographic voting protocols, but
without using any cryptography, using only paper bal-
lots. We partially succeed. (Initially, I thought the pro-
posal accomplished this goal, but several readers discov-
ered a vote-buying attack (see Section 4.4) that appears
to be rather difficult to fix without making the result-
ing system much less usable in practice. Currently, this
paper should thus be viewed more as an academic pro-
posal than a practical proposal. Perhaps some variation
on these ideas in this paper might still turn out to be
of practical use. The “OneBallot with Exchanged Re-
ceipts” system sketched at the end of Section 5.3.1, looks
particularly promising at the moment. . . )
The principles of ThreeBallot are simple and easy to
understand.
In this proposal, not only can each voter verify that
her vote is recorded as she intended, but she gets a “re-
ceipt” that she can take home that can be used later
to verify that her vote is actually included in the final
tally. Her receipt, however, does not allow her to prove
to anyone else how she voted.
In this “ThreeBallot” voting system, each voter casts
three paper ballots, with certain restrictions on how they
may be filled out, so the tallying works. These paper
ballots are of course “voter-verifiable.” All ballots cast
are scanned and published on a web site, so anyone may
correctly compute the election result.
A voter receives a copy of one of her ballots as her
“receipt”, which she may take home. Only the voter
knows which ballot she copied for her receipt. The voter
is unable to use her receipt to prove how she voted or to
sell her vote, as the receipt doesn’t reveal how she voted.
A voter can check that the web site contains a ballot
∗The latest version of this paper can always
be found at http://theory.csail.mit.edu/~rivest/
Rivest-TheThreeBallotVotingSystem.pdf
matching her receipt. Deletion or modification of bal-
lots is thus detectable; so the integrity of the election is
verifiable.
1 Introduction
Designing secure voting systems is tough, since the con-
straints are apparently contradictory. In particular, the
requirement for voter privacy (no one should know how
Alice voted, even if Alice wants them to know) seems
to contradict verifiability (how can Alice verify that her
vote was counted as she intended?).
The proposal presented here is an attempt to satisfy
these constraints without the use of cryptograpy. We get
pretty close...
Like most cryptographic proposals, ThreeBallot uses a
public “bulletin board”–a public web site where election
officials post copies of all of the cast ballots (there will
be 3n of them if there are n voters) and a list of the
names of the voters who voted. (Some states might use
voter ID’s rather than voter names.)
One key principle of ThreeBallot is to “vote by rows”
and “cast by columns”. The ThreeBallot ballot can
viewed as an array, where the voter places marks in
rows corresponding to candidates, but then separates
the columns and casts them separately, keeping a copy
of one.
ThreeBallot provides a nice level of end-to-end
verifiability—the voter gets assurance that her vote was
cast as intended and counted as cast, and that election
officials haven’t tampered with the collection of ballots
counted.
2 Background
We assume that the reader is somewhat familiar with
voting systems. For more background, the following
readings are recommended:
• Roy Saltman’s new book, The History and Politics
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of Voting Technology [19] is an outstanding schol-
arly history of the evolution of voting technology.
• Andrew Gumbel’s book Steal This Vote [9] is an
excellent, entertaining, and very readable review of
election fraud in America.
• The Brennan Center for Justice has published an
excellent report [1] on voting system security, with
detailed discussions of specific threats and assess-
ments of the risks they represent.
• Randell and Ryan’s recent excellent article, “Vot-
ing Technologies and Trust,” [15], which, like this
paper, explores paper-based voting system architec-
tures similar to those of cryptographic voting sys-
tems.
• Ben Adida’s recent PhD thesis [3] (particularly
Chapter 1) reviews voting system requirements and
cryptographic voting systems, before giving im-
proved cryptographic voting systems.
• There are numerous web sites with information and
links about voting and voting technology, such those
of Doug Jones [10], myself [16], the CalTechMIT
Voting Technology Project [14], ACCURATE [2],
or the Election Assistance Commission [7], to name
just a few. (Try googling “voting technology”.)
3 Details
We now describe the ThreeBallot voting system in more
detail.
3.1 Checking In to the Poll Site
Each voter identifies herself as usual at the poll site,
and then gets a paper “multi-ballot” to vote with. (For
convenience in this exposition, the voter will always be
feminine.)
3.2 The Multi-Ballot
The multi-ballot consists of three ballots. They may
be ballots on separate sheets of paper, or three ballots
printed on a single sheet of paper, with perforations to
allow later separation. For ease of exposition, we assume
that later arrangement for now.
ThreeBallot is perhaps most easily viewed as a vari-
ation or extension of “mark-sense” (“optical scan” or
“opscan”) systems [11].
In this arrangement, the multi-ballot has three
columns, each of which is a complete ballot. Each bal-
lot is identical, except that the ballot ID number on the
bottom of each ballot is unique. There are vertical per-
forations between the ballots, so they can be separated.
See Figure 1.
Each ballot has two parts: the upper “voting region,”
and then the “ballot ID region” on the lower part.
The voting region of a ballot contains the candidate
names, each with an op-scan bubble that can be filled
in by the voter.
Each ballot has a distinct ballot ID, different from the
ID’s of other ballots on its multi-ballot and from all other
ballot ID’s. The ballot ID’s on the three ballots of a
multi-ballot are unrelated in any way to each other, they
are merely randomly assigned unique ballot ID’s, with
no cryptographic or other significance. The ballot ID
might be a long (e.g. 7-digit) number which is essentially
random, or some other unique identifier, possibly in bar-
coded form. For now, we’ll assume that the ballot ID’s
are pre-printed on the ballots, but we’ll see that there are
security advantages to having them added later instead
by the voter or by the “checker” (see Section 3.4).
3.3 Filling Out The Multi-Ballot
The voter is given the following instructions for filling
out the multi-ballot. See Figure 2 for an example of a
filled-out multi-ballot.
• You have here three optical scan ballots arranged as
three columns; you will be casting all three ballots.
• Proceed row by row through the multi-ballot. Each
row corresponds to one candidate. There are three
“bubbles” in a row, one on each ballot.
• To vote FOR a candidate, you must fill in
exactly two of the bubbles on that candidate’s row.
You may choose arbitrarily which two bubbles in
that row to fill in. (It doesn’t matter, as all three
ballots will be cast.)
• To vote AGAINST a candidate (i.e., to not vote
FOR the candidate, or to cast a “null” vote for
that candidate), you must fill in exactly one of the
bubbles on that candidate’s row. You may choose
arbitrarily which bubble in that row to fill in. (It
doesn’t matter, as all three ballots will be cast.)
• You must fill in at least one bubble in each row;
your multi-ballot will not be accepted if a row is
left entirely blank.
• You may not fill in all three bubbles in a row; your
multi-ballot will not be accepted if a row has all
three bubbles filled in.
• You may vote FOR at most one candidate per
race, unless indicated otherwise (In some races, you
are allowed to vote FOR several candidates, up to
a specified maximum number.) It is OK to vote
AGAINST all candidates.
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BALLOT
President
Alex Jones
Bob Smith
Carol Wu
Senator
Dave Yip
Ed Zinn
3147524
BALLOT
President
Alex Jones
Bob Smith
Carol Wu
Senator
Dave Yip
Ed Zinn
7523416
BALLOT
President
Alex Jones
Bob Smith
Carol Wu
Senator
Dave Yip
Ed Zinn
5530219
Figure 1: A sample ThreeBallot multi-ballot, with a first race for President with candidates Jones, Smith, and Wu
and a second race for Senator with candidates Yip and Zinn.
• The above rules are complete. Don’t worry about
how an individual ballot looks—it may have a num-
ber of filled-in bubbles for a given race that is less
than, or greater than, one.
We will call a filled-in bubble a mark (for the candi-
date of that row).
Note that any one of the three ballots, when viewed
in the conventional way, might be an “overvote” (more
than one candidate marked in a race), or an “undervote”
(no candidates marked in a race). That is OK here. But
when the three ballots are viewed together, they must
be properly filled out, with at most one candidate per
race having two marks and all other candidates having
exactly one mark.
3.4 Checking the Filled-Out Multi-
Ballot
When a voter has so indicated her choices, she inserts her
multi-ballot in the “checker machine,” whose primary
purpose is to check the validity of her multi-ballot.
The checker machine might be in the voting booth, or
somewhere in the middle of the voting area.
The checker checks that the voter has made exactly
one or two marks for each candidate (the “row con-
straints”), and has made two marks for at most one
candidate in each race (the “race constraints”).
Note that for the race constraints to be checked, the
checker needs to have a description of the structure of
the ballot style—where races start and end on the ballot,
and how many candidates can be voted for in a given
race.
If the multi-ballot is invalid, the machine beeps and
indicates where the voter has put too few or too many
marks.
If the multi-ballot is OK, the machine beeps (now in
a nice way) and puts a horizontal red stripe across the
bottom of the multi-ballot (below the ID’s). (It may
also print other information on the ballots, such as au-
thenticating information.)
When the checker spits back a correct multi-ballot, it
also cuts it into three separate ballots along the perfo-
rations.
Once the red stripe is there, the multi-ballot must then
be cast, as three separated ballots. (This is enforced by
procedures at the poll site.)
The checker machine makes no recordings of what it
has seen; it is stateless and pretty “dumb” (although
the checker does need to be able to accept as input a
description of the ballot style, as noted above, in order
to check the race constraints).
(A “really dumb” checker would be election ballot-
style independent, and thus would check only the row
constraints. Such a checker might have some utility... It
is also interesting to consider somewhat more complex
checkers, such as the “Shamos checker” of Section 5.2.2,
which prints ballot ID’s on the ballots, etc.)
The voter now has three separated ballots.
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BALLOT
President
Alex Jones
Bob Smith
Carol Wu
Senator
Dave Yip
Ed Zinn
3147524
BALLOT
President
Alex Jones
Bob Smith
Carol Wu
Senator
Dave Yip
Ed Zinn
7523416
BALLOT
President
Alex Jones
Bob Smith
Carol Wu
Senator
Dave Yip
Ed Zinn
5530219
Figure 2: A filled-out version the multi-ballot of Figure 1, showing a vote FOR Smith for President and a vote FOR
Zinn as Senator, since the rows for these candidates have two filled-in bubbles (marks) each. All other rows have
exactly one mark. (There are many other ways such choices could have been indicated.) Note that ballot 7523416,
when viewed as a conventional ballot, looks like an overvote for President.
3.5 Getting a Ballot Copy as a “Re-
ceipt”
The voter should also receive a copy of one of her three
ballots as her take-home “receipt”. It is important that
she is allowed to choose secretly and arbitrarily which of
the three ballots she receives a copy of. The receipt could
be printed on yellow paper, say, so it looks different than
her three original ballots.
Rather than having a separate copying station, which
has certain security risks, the copier is best embedded
in the checker. That is, the checker should also be a
(partial) copier—if the multi-ballot checks out OK, then
the voter pushes button “1”, “2”, or “3” on the checker
to get her three (now separated) ballots and also the
copy of her indicated ballot. Which of the three ballots
she choses to get a copy of should be known only to her.
The voter should of course check that her receipt in-
deed matches its corresponding ballot.
3.6 Casting Three Ballots
The voter now casts all three original ballots by putting
them separately into the ballot box. The ballot box has
the property, as usual, that it effectively scrambles the
ballot order, destroying any indication of which triple of
ballots originally went together, and what order ballots
were cast in.
Note how ThreeBallot follows the philosophy of “vote
by rows, cast by columns”—each candidate’s vote is in
a given row, but the ballots are columns. Each ballot by
itself (and thus the receipt that the voter takes home)
contains no information about the whether the multi-
ballot was a vote FOR or AGAINST the candidate.
3.7 Going Home
The voter takes her receipt, and goes home. (In one
interesting variation of ThreeBallot, discussed in Sec-
tion 5.3.1 below, the voter may, on her way out of the
polling site, exchange her receipt for that of another
voter’s.)
3.8 Posting the Ballots
At the end of election day, the entire set of ballots cast
is scanned and published on the bulletin board.
(The scanning process produces only a “compact” rep-
resentation of the voter’s choices that just records the
marks present and the ballot ID. A pixel-level scan is
not used because it would introduce the problem that
a voter could put stray scribbles in the margin of the
ballot that would allow her to identify her ballot image
later.)
The election officials will also post on the bulletin
board a list of the names of all voters who voted in the
election.
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3.9 Checking the Integrity of the Bul-
letin Board
A voter can check later, after she has gone home, if
she wishes, that her receipt does indeed match a bal-
lot posted on the bulletin board. (She could also give
her receipt, or a copy of it, to someone else, to check
for her, if she doesn’t have a convenient way to access
the bulletin board, or is too busy to do so herself. See
Adida [3] for a discussion of helper organizations.)
If the bulletin board doesn’t contain a ballot match-
ing her receipt, she can take her receipt to an election
official and file a protest. There should be a time limit
(e.g. two days) on when such protests can be filed. The
election official may examine the voter’s receipt to de-
termine its authenticity, and may authorize a rescan of
the cast paper ballots.
3.10 Tallying and Announcing the Win-
ners
The ballots can be tallied by anyone, since they are pub-
licly posted in “plaintext” on the bulletin board. (No
decryption is needed, as is the case with cryptographic
voting systems.)
The winners can be announced.
Note that each voter has effectively marked exactly
once or twice for each candidate (due to the “row con-
straints”), and has marked twice for at most one can-
didate in each race (due to the “race constraints”); the
checker has enforced these properties.
So each candidate’s tally will be “as usual,” except
that each total is inflated by the number of voters. The
election outcome is the same.
For example, if there are n voters, and candidates A,
B, and C would ordinarily have received a, b, and c
votes, respectively, then with ThreeBallot the final tal-
lies will show n + a, n + b, and n + c marks for A, B,
and C, respectively; the vote totals for each candidate
can be obtained by subtracting the number n of voters
from the total number of marks for that candidate.
This completes our description of the operation of the
ThreeBallot voting system. We now turn to a discussion
of its security.
4 Security — Integrity
Of the two main voting system security requirements—
(1) integrity of election results and (2) voter privacy—we
begin with the first, since it is arguably more important.
The voter can check that
• a ballot matching her receipt is posted on the bul-
letin board in the list of cast ballots, and
• the total number of ballots on the bulletin board
is three times the number of voters who voted (the
list of voters who actually voted is also published
on the bulletin board).
These checks (particularly the first), don’t have ana-
logues in most current voting systems. They allow de-
tection of several kinds of fraud, as we shall see. Of
course, one has to be careful, when one adds new se-
curity mechanisms, that they can’t themselves be easily
attacked. So we also consider here attacks on these ad-
ditional checks. Nonetheless, one shouldn’t lose track of
the fact that these new checks in any case will be provid-
ing an increased level of integrity and security, compared
to systems where there are no comparable checks. That
is to say, these new checks are effectively another layer
of defense against attacks on the voting system; other
currently-used security mechanisms (e.g. for opscan sys-
tems) aren’t replaced, merely augmented. Security can
only get better.
4.1 Adding Ballots can be Detected
An adversary can’t increase the number of ballots on
the bulletin board without simultaneously putting more
voter names on the bulletin board, which should be de-
tected by someone, somehow (Grandma, did you really
vote? Weren’t you sick that day?)
4.2 Modifying or Deleting Ballots can
be Detected
An adversary can’t delete or modify any posted ballots,
without risking a voter protesting that her receipt isn’t
matched by a ballot on the bulletin board. (Either it
isn’t there, or a ballot with the right ballot ID number
is there, but its marks are missing or different.)
Of course, an adversary might risk modifying just a
few ballots, hoping to avoid detection. But any large-
scale fraud would get detected, with even a low level of
vigilance on the part of voters or their proxies.
Since attacks by adding, modifying, or deleting bal-
lots are detectable, voters can have confidence in the
correctness of the finaly tally.
4.3 No Voter Coercion or Vote Selling
One design goal of the ThreeBallot system is that the
voter should not be able to sell her vote, since her receipt
doesn’t bear any reliable information on how she voted.
Note that no matter whom she votes for, her receipt
can have any possible pattern of marks. (There are 2r
such marking patterns for the receipt if there are r rows
on a ballot, from completely empty to completely filled.)
Moreover, the voter has complete control over what
pattern of marks are shown on her receipt.
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A coercer can pay the voter to come back with a re-
ceipt showing some particular pattern of marks, and the
voter can do so, without affecting her ability to vote in
any way she chooses. She can put the coercer’s desired
pattern of marks in ballot 1, and then fill in ballots 2 and
3 to achieve her desired voting pattern. Ballots 2 and
3 can “outvote” ballot 1 as necessary. She then takes a
copy of ballot 1 away as her receipt to give to the coercer
for cash.
4.4 The “Three-Pattern” Attack
But there is another attack that might allow a coercer
to buy votes or influence a voter’s voting behavior.
[This is the attack that I overlooked in earlier versions
of this paper, and which was pointed out to me by several
readers (thanks!).]
In this “three-pattern” attack, the adversary pays the
voter to vote according to pre-specified patterns in each
of her three ballots. That is, the adversary isn’t paying
for the voter’s “net vote”, but paying for her to create
her net vote in a specific pattern of three individual bal-
lots. If the adversary doesn’t see all three pre-specified
ballots posted on the public bulletin board, the voter
doesn’t get paid (or perhaps the voter is punished some-
how by the adversary).
This attack is particularly troublesome, and in the
end, it makes ThreeBallot much less attractive than I
had originally hoped for.
There are nonetheless several ways one can try to pre-
vent this attack or mitigate its effects:
• The multi-ballots may come pre-printed with one
mark already randomly placed in every row.
• The voter may use a DRE/EBP (DRE/electronic
ballot printer) to create and print her multi-ballot
see Section 9.3. The voter enters her choices on a
touch-screen. The DRE controls the random allo-
cation of marks in each row.
• A voter can conspire with two other voters to ensure
that a particular triple of ballots appears on the
bulletin board, without constraining how any of the
three voters votes.
• Use the “cell-based approach” described in Sec-
tion 5.3.1, wherein each ballot now corresponds to
an individual cell of the r × 3 array, rather than
corresponding to a complete column of that array.
Each of these approaches itself has problems. From
a theoretical point of view, the cell-based approach is
probably the best. From a practical point of view, using
a DRE/EBP may be best.
4.5 Recounts and Audits
Because the ballots are cast in paper form, it is possible
to rescan and recount them in that form. A recount of
some precincts might be mandated by state law, particu-
larly for close elections. Or, a recount might be triggered
if sufficiently many voters (or any voters!) credibly claim
that their receipts aren’t represented correctly or at all
on the bulletin board.
4.6 Detecting Malicious Voters
The receipt may need some additional authentication, as
usual here (e.g. Adida [3, Section 5.3]), to prevent voters
from maliciously claiming that their (fabricated) receipt
doesn’t match any ballot on the bulletin board. This
authentication could take the form of a seal or sticker on
the receipt, perhaps on the back, or a digital signature
on the receipt.
Note that it is OK for the voter to show her receipt
to an election official, so that the official can mark it as
an officially approved receipt, since voter privacy isn’t
threatened. However, the election official should not
record the ID number of her receipt.
4.7 Attacking the Checker
The checkers need to be tested carefully. A maliciously
modified checker might allow voters voting for a par-
ticular candidate to cast three marks for a candidate,
and/or no marks for another candidate. Voters who can
cast ballots violating these “row constraints” would then
have more “weight” than ordinary voters.
An ordinary voter can increase the total number of
marks cast for her favored candidate by one mark, rela-
tive to the total number of marks cast for other candi-
dates, since she casts two marks for her favored candi-
date and one mark for other candidates.
If the checker is corrupt or defective, a voter may be
able to increase the relative number of marks cast for
her favored candidate by three marks, since she could
be allowed to cast three marks for her favored candidate
and none for the other candidates. This is obviously in
violation of a principle of democratic voting—each voter
should have an equal influence on the result.
Note that such illegal voting patterns can’t generally
be detected later or during a recount, since the “row
constraint” can’t be tested again once the multi-ballot
is split into separate ballots.
(Of course, in some cases you may be able to tell that
such an attack has been mounted. If a candidate ends up
with a mark total of more than 2n, or less than n, where
n is the number of voters, then some row conditions must
have been violated. But often you just won’t be able to
tell, once the multi-ballots have been separated.)
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Thus, we see that there is some dependency of the
correctness of the election outcome on the correctness
of the checker (assuming that some voters would exploit
an opportunity afforded by a defective checker).
On the other hand, the row conditions are exception-
ally simple to check, and a simple hard-wired mecha-
nism for checking them in the checker may be sufficiently
trustable that one can have confidence in their correct
operation on election day.
It is interesting to compare this situation with other
forms of VVPR (voter-verified paper records), such as
DRE-VVPAT or ordinary opscan ballots. ThreeBallot
is like these other forms of VVPR, in that the voter can
directly verify her own paper ballot (or multi-ballot), to
ensure that her own intent has been captured correctly
on paper. But with ThreeBallot there is an additional
risk, that if the checker has been corrupted, then other
voters might be able to cast a “heavier” vote than hers.
The corresponding risks with the more traditional forms
of VVPR are the usual forms of “casting multiple votes,”
and “ballot stuffing”, wherein someone may add many
extra votes (not just two extra votes) to the ballot box.
Also, ThreeBallot allows voters to detect modification of
the collection of cast ballots, whereas the other VVPR
schemes don’t even try to detect such attacks. I think on
balance ThreeBallot addresses better the more serious
threats.
It is also interesting to compare this situation with
cryptographic voting schemes. A bad checker in Three-
Ballot might allow a voter to cast an invalid multi-ballot;
cryptographic schemes either make such invalid voting
impossible or require the voter to post with her vote a
proof that her (encrypted) ballot is valid.
We also note (as pointed out by John Kelsey) that a
maliciously modified checker, since it knows which bal-
lot is being copied for the receipt, might be able to en-
code this information on the ballots themselves (say by
using a bit of steganography in the way the red stripe
is placed on the ballots); a correspondingly corrupted
scanner would then know which ballots it could scan in-
correctly. This sort of michievous behavior also needs
to be prevented, by design of the checker, or by other
controls.
4.8 Paying for Receipts
Another potential vulnerability occurs if the adversary is
able to buy (or otherwise obtain) the receipts of voters as
they leave the poll site, and if the adversary also has the
ability to manipulate the contents of the bulletin board.
In general, there is a problem if an adversary can modify
the bulletin board and can find out somehow what the
serial numbers are on the receipts.
In this attack the adversary pays the voter to surren-
der her receipt, as she leaves the polling site.
Then, knowing that the voter has now given up her
ability to contest the corruption of the corresponding
posted electronic version of this ballot, the adversary
can modify the posting on the bulletin board of her cor-
responding ballot.
This attack is somewhat complex and difficult to
mount, but not impossible.
Some techniques are available for reducing the risk of
such an attack.
Voters should be cautioned not to casually discard
or give away their receipts. (The adversary would be
happy to take for free via “dumpster diving” what he
might otherwise pay for.) If the voter uses a “helper
organization” (e.g. the League of Women Voters) as a
proxy to check bulletin board integrity, the voter might
deposit with the helper organization just a copy of her
receipt, rather than the original receipt. She can even
deposit copies with several helper organizations.
There should be strong safeguards on bulletin board
modification; this provides a “layered defense”. Indeed,
current voting systems rely for their security entirely on
such safeguards, since they provide voters with no ca-
pability whatsoever to verify the contents of the official
list of cast ballots. In this sense, ThreeBallot can’t help
but be an improvement over current systems. Even if
an adversary can buy or obtain receipts, that only puts
him in a position comparable to what he would be in
with current voting systems.
Another approach for defeating this attack is for vot-
ers to retain an extra secret copy of their receipt—the
adversary thinks he is getting the only copy of the re-
ceipt, but in fact he is not. If the receipt is signed at the
poll site by an election official with a digital signature
represented in scannable form (e.g. a bar-code), then a
copy of the receipt is as good as the original as far as
protesting goes, so the adversary can’t “take away” the
voter’s ability to protest if she retains a secret copy of
her receipt.
This attack also works for many of the cryptographic
schemes in the literature; the only prior treatments of
this attack to my knowledge are by Ryan and Pea-
cock [17, Section 5.4], who suggest both voter education
and having election officials keeping additional copies of
the receipts at the polling site, and by Karlof et al. [13,
Section 5.2], who suggest voter education.
Other, more exotic approaches (such as “range
voting”—see Section 9.7) could also mitigate the poten-
tial damage an adversary could do through this sort of
attack, since the vote tallies would then be on the aver-
age much larger, and changing only one ballot per vote
would have a smaller relative effect.
4.9 Chain Voting
Any paper-based voting system needs to consider the
possibility of a “chain-voting” attack (see Jones’ excel-
lent description [12]). The usual remedies–e.g. mech-
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anisms to ensure that voters actually cast the ballots
they were originally given–are applicable here as well.
See Jones [12] for details.
5 Security — Voter Privacy
We now turn to the second main security requirement
for voting: maintaining voter privacy.
The first of Professor Michael Shamos’s “Command-
ments” [20] on voting is:
Thou shalt keep each voter’s choices an invio-
lable secret.
Even if the voter wishes to violate her own privacy,
there should be no way for her to do so. She should not
be able to convince anyone else that she voted in a par-
ticular way—otherwise she could sell her vote. (This is
one reason why I strongly favor pollsite voting, with its
enforced voter isolation during voting, over remote vot-
ing schemes such vote-by-mail, vote-by-phone, or vote-
by-Internet.)
What evidence could the voter give to an adversary,
in an effort to convince the adversary of how she voted?
The are three sorts of evidence available:
• physical evidence the voter brings away from the
the voting session (such as her voting receipt),
• other evidence the voter may bring away from the
voting session (such as ballot ID’s she may have
memorized or photographed), and
• the bulletin board of all cast ballots.
5.1 Does the Receipt violate Voter Pri-
vacy?
We note that there is nothing to prevent a voter from,
when she wishes to vote “FOR” a candidate, always
marking just the first two ballots, and, when she wishes
to vote “AGAINST” a candidate, marking just the
third ballot. If she takes a copy of her first (or second)
ballot as her receipt, the marks on her receipt indicate
exactly how her votes will be tallied.
But her receipt is at best only a “reminder” of how
she voted, not a proof that will convince anyone else as
to how she voted. The voter is unable to intentionally
violate her own privacy by showing someone else her
receipt. (We have already argued, in Section 4.3, that
a voter’s receipt, by itself, bears no information about
how a voter voted. So, the receipt, by itself, does not
violate voter privacy.)
5.2 Can the Receipt be linked with its
other two ballots?
There should be no way for anyone to be able to reli-
ably and convincingly link together the three ballots on
the bulletin board that together constitute an original
cast multi-ballot. If this could be done, then the voter’s
privacy is at risk, since the ballot ID on her receipt can
allow identification as to which linked triple of ballots (a
reconstituted multi-ballot) is hers, revealing her vote.
5.2.1 Risk at the Printers
We should ensure that no-one knows ahead of time what
triples of ID’s constitute a multi-ballot.
There is potentially a risk to voter privacy at the print-
ing establishment, if someone there records which ballot
IDs were printed on the same multi-ballot. (This prob-
lem is shared with some cryptographic voting schemes,
such as Preˆt a` Voter.)
Some approaches to mitigating or eliminating this
threat are:
• Procedural controls at the printers and within ballot
delivery, to ensure that inappropriate records are
not kept.
• Not printing combined multi-ballots, but only in-
dividual ballots, each with their own ballot ID as
usual. Then the voter assembles a multi-ballot by
randomly picking three ballots from the collection
of blank ballots when she signs in to vote.
• Having the voter add the ballot ID’s to the bal-
lots using individual ballot ID “stickers” drawn ran-
domly from a bin of such stickers. (All the ID num-
bers within a bin being distinct, of course.) The
stickers could have the ID numbers under scratch-
off, if you like, although the scratch-off needs to be
removed from one ballot just before it is copied to
make a receipt, and from the other two as well just
after the ballots are cast but just before they are
scanned for posting on the bulletin board.
• Having the checker add the ballot ID’s to the ballots
(see the description of the “Shamos checker” in the
next section).
5.2.2 Risk That the Voter can identify her
Multi-Ballot
The voter should not be able to record or remember the
ballot ID numbers of her three ballots, at least not in a
believable manner. (Voters should not be allowed to take
photos of their multi-ballot with a camera or cellphone!)
Some approaches towards achieving this goal include:
• Printing the ballot ID’s in a 1D or 2D bar-code,
which is hard for the voter to parse and remember.
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Of course, this makes it hard for the voter to read
the ballot ID later when she wants to look it up on
the bulletin board.
• Printing the ballot as a long string of digits or let-
ters, most of which are fixed “noise” and only a few
encode the varying ballot ID. For example, a ballot
ID might look like:
852471004563110655873145
a string of length 25, where only digits in positions
4,7,11, 15, 19, and 22 vary and and used to represent
the ballot ID. (Can you remember enough about the
above ID to recreate it given the following ID?)
852471104583117655976145
• The ballot ID’s could be under “scratch-off,” as
noted above.
• (The “Shamos checker”.) Michael Shamos sug-
gested the following nifty approach, which prevents
the voter from ever seeing the ballot IDs of the two
ballots not copied to make a receipt:
– All multi-ballots are initially identical and con-
tain no ballot ID’s.
– When the checker determines that a multi-
ballot is valid, it prints three randomly gen-
erated ballot ID’s on the three ballots, but re-
tains the ballots for now.
– The voter selects which ballot she wishes to
have copied for her receipt.
– The checker spits out both the selected ballot
and a copy of it (her receipt), and puts the
other two ballots into a holding bin.
– She checks that the receipt and the selected
ballot are identical. If so, she puts the se-
lected ballot into the ballot box and presses the
“Done” button on the checker, which empties
the holding bin (containing her other two bal-
lots) into the ballot box, in such a way that she
never sees their ballot ID’s. If not, she pushes
the “I got a bad receipt” button on the checker
(which now empties the holding bin with her
other two ballots into a spoiled ballot bucket),
complains to a pollworker by showing the se-
lected ballot and unequal printed receipt, and
votes again.
The “Shamos checker” keeps the voter from ever
seeing the ballot ID’s of her other two ballots, so
we don’t need to worry about her memorizing them
or photographing them! It is also consistent with
state laws (like California’s) that require all blank
ballots to be identical.
5.2.3 Risk of Copying
It is probably better not to give the voter access to a
generic copying machine in order to make a copy of one
of her three ballots. This would risk that the voter makes
a copy of all three of her ballots.
There should be procedural or mechanical controls to
ensure that the voter only gets a copy of one of her three
ballots, and can’t use the copier to copy her other ballots
or their ballot ID’s.
The approach described earlier, where the copier is
embedded in the checker machine, is perhaps the sim-
plest way to enforce such copying limits. The checker
machine should refuse to produce a copy of a ballot if
it has already been checked (e.g. if it contains the red
“checked OK” stripe).
Another approach (suggested by Silvio Micali), might
be to have the ballots come automatically attached with
carbonless copying paper underneath, so copies are made
automatically while the voter votes. No copying machine
is needed then, but you need to ensure that the voter
only takes away only one of the three copies made.
5.3 Risk of ballot modification before
casting
There is also a risk that a voter might modify her ballots,
after they have been approved by the checker, but before
they are cast into the ballot box.
If she makes additional marks on her ballots, or erases
marks on her ballots, after they have been approved by
the checker but before she casts them into the ballot box,
she may be able to commit election fraud without de-
tection, since the row and race constraints are no longer
checkable once the ballots are split up.
The natural mechanisms for defeating such attacks
include:
• making sure the voter doesn’t handle the ballots
after the checker approves them (some conveyance
would be needed to get the ballots to the ballot
box),
• including along with the red stripe some “check-
sum” information on the ballot (possibly a bar-
coded representation of the marks that are supposed
to be on the ballot) that would be difficult for the
voter to manipulate.
5.3.1 The Reconstruction Attack
In a “reconstruction” attack the adversary examines all
possible triples of ballots from the bulletin board, and
determines which of them form legal ThreeBallot ballots.
The information gained may, in some cases, be suffi-
cient to determine how an individual voter voted, when
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taked together with the ballot ID available on the voter’s
receipt.
The problem here is that a ballot contains too much
information linked together. If there are r rows in the
3 × r matrix of the multi-ballot, then there are 3r cells
in the matrix, and a ballot contains and links together
r individual cells.
We discuss three approaches for dealing with this at-
tack: by ignoring it, by casting ballots by cells (indi-
vidual bubbles) rather than by columns, and by having
voters exchange receipts as they leave the poll site.
Determine if it is likely to be a problem
The first approach is to try to figure out more care-
fully, either with mathematical models or with simula-
tions, whether or not this is a realistic concern. How
likely is it that an adversary can actually figure out un-
ambiguously how a voter voted, given the voter’s receipt
copy and the posted list of cast ballots?
This is not easy to work out, as it depends on how
voters utilize their freedom to mark their ballots.
In some cases it can be a serious problem. If all vot-
ers completely fill in the first ballot, leave the third
ballot completely blank, and give their choices on the
second ballot, and take a copy of the second ballot
home, then if there are four or more candidates in some
race, the voter’s retained copy can only be matched up
with a completely-filled first-column ballot and a com-
pletely empty third-column ballot, thus revealing how
each voter voted. This is a very worst-case example,
since it requires that all voters vote this way.
With more arbitrary patterns of voting, one could
crudely estimate that it might require the election to
have a dozen races or more before an adversary can start
matching up valid triples. Even then, it is very delicate,
and there may be multiple ways in which a given ballot
could participate in a valid triple.
One could attempt to argue that ThreeBallot pro-
vides an order of magnitude improvement in ensuring
integrity, and so a small chance of eroding voter privacy
is perhaps acceptable. (Certainly, those who, say, vote
by mail are in potentially a much worse situation, since
an adversary can force them to reveal their ballot before
it is mailed.) But we should first see if we might not be
able to do better here. The following two sections give
some other approaches to handling this problem.
A cell-based approach
Our second approach provides a solid “fix” to the re-
construction problem, but at the cost of making the
whole scheme exceptionally awkward and difficult. How-
ever, it demonstrates that the problem is fixable in prin-
ciple, so the quest is then to find the best solution.
The idea is to change the focus from ballots as columns
of an r × 3 array, to ballots as single cells or entries of
that array. Each entry would have its own “cell ID.” The
voter casts 3r ballots, one for each cell. As a receipt, the
voter retains copies of r cells, one from each row, selected
arbitrarily.
This makes the method much(!) less practical, but
absolutely defeats any reconstruction attack. There is
no way that an adversary can look at a collection of
3nr individual “cell ballots”, and figure out the vote
corresponding to any given receipt of r ballots. There
will be multiple cell receipts for each row, some being
unfilled and some being filled; they can be grouped into
triples in a huge number of ways, and there is no way to
tell which way is correct.
ThreeBallot with Exchanged Receipts
However, the best approach to the problem may derive
from thinking about the functions of the receipts a bit
more carefully.
The receipt is used in two ways: it is compared by the
voter against its corresponding ballot before the ballot
is cast, and it is used when the voter checks to see that
the bulletin board contains a corresponding ballot.
The voter should check that her receipt actually
matches the corresponding ballot that she will be cast-
ing, before she casts her three ballots. Only the voter
can do this check, and she needs to have her own receipt
and her own ballot in hand to do this comparison.
The reconstruction attack only works for an adversary,
however, if the voter is known to be bringing a copy of
her own ballot home as a receipt.
On the other hand, for the purpose of integrity check-
ing the contents of the bulletin board, the voter only
needs to bring home a copy of some ballot that was ac-
tually cast. If the receipt brought home by the voter isn’t
necessarily a copy of one of her own ballots, then there
is no way for an adversary to bribe or coerce her, even
with her cooperation and even if the adversary is able
to successfully link together ballot triples on the bulletin
board.
Here are some ideas for ensuring that an adversary
can’t count on the receipt brought home by a voter nec-
essarily being a copy of one of her actual ballots:
• Ensure that voters have a mandatory opportunity
to exchange receipts on their way out of the poll
site.
• Keep a basket near the exit door. At the the be-
ginning of the day, “pre-load” the basket with six
“dummy” receipts. The serial numbers of the dum-
mies will be officially recorded and posted on the
bulletin board. When the voter leaves, require her
to take away one of the receipts in the exit basket,
and then to leave her own receipt in the basket. The
receipts remaining in the basket at the end of the
day are officially recorded and posted on the bul-
letin board. (This protocol is due to Devegili [8],
and is known as the “Farnel” protocol, although
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Farnel proposed it for ballots and not receipts. See
also Arau´jo et al. [4] for a description of Farnel in
English and an adaption to electronic voting.)
• Voters could be given two copies of their selected
ballot, and then could exchange one of them with
one of someone else’s receipts, or via an exit basket.
(Indeed, once you have forced exchanges, you could
give the voter a copy of each of her three ballots, as-
suming that she is likely to check their correctness,
but that she won’t be bringing all of them home;
she’ll be bringing home other legitimate copies of
ballots instead.)
This last approach, of enabling or requiring exchanges
of ballot copies, say by using the Farnel protocol, seems
the best. I’m optimistic that it can be implemented in
such a way as to prevent an adversary from effectively
bribing or coercing voters, even if the adversary could
figure out some valid triples of ballots from the bulletin
board.
Aside: OneBallot with Exchanged Receipts
Such “receipt exchange” protocols could also plausibly
be used with a conventional opscan approach (“OneBal-
lot”), where the voter receives a copy of her (single)
ballot, checks that it correctly corresponds to this sin-
gle ballot she will be casting, casts her single ballot,
then (potentially) exchanges her receipt for another le-
gitimate receipt before leaving for home. All cast ballots
are posted on the bulletin board as usual, and the voter
can check that the receipt she has indeed appears on
the bulletin board, even though it may not be a copy
of her own ballot. We can call this approach “OneBal-
lot with Exchanged Receipts”; and because it is simpler
than ThreeBallot with Exchanged Receipts, it is worth
closer examination. Such receipt-exchange protocols can
be modelled on the paper ballot exchange protocols of
Farnel [8] (see also [4]), as sketched already above.
6 Usability
6.1 Usability for Voters
The ThreeBallot voting process is more complex than
current conventional voting systems, so the impact on
usability must be considered.
Of course, the main method for making sure that the
voting system works well for voters is voter education.
Although ThreeBallot is new, it is not very complicated,
and a little voter education should make its operation
clear.
However, if a voter makes a mistake, the process of
recasting her ballot is not so simple. (Well, it’s like
opscan: you need to start over with a clean ballot.)
Voters who have difficulty with filling out a Three-
Ballot multiballot could be given simplified instructions
(e.g. always fill in the bubbles from left to right in a
row).
Or, voters could be given preprinted ballots, where
each preprinted ballot already has one randomly-placed
mark in each row. Voters would then be told to place an
additional mark in the row of their chosen candidate.
Or, a voter could use a conventional (“OneBallot”)
methods, since you can “mix” OneBallot and ThreeBal-
lot ballots together (see Section 9.4).
Still, any additional increase in the complexity of vot-
ing is certain to cause some voter confusion and prob-
lems, so there is certainly a potential price to be paid,
in terms of usability, for the security benefits of Three-
Ballot.
ThreeBallot could be implemented with electronic bal-
lot printers (see Section 9.3) that print out a multi-ballot
or three ballots at once. Using electronic ballot print-
ers is also a typical way of making voting systems more
accessible.
The usability of ThreeBallot can be improved and re-
fined with experience, and voters would become familiar
with it over time. Perhaps voters would enjoy being able
to vote “more than once”!
The benefit is that ThreeBallot provides major im-
provements in election integrity, at the cost of some im-
pact on the ease of voting.
6.2 Usability for Pollworkers and Elec-
tion Officials
ThreeBallot does make some extra work for pollworkers,
since the number of paper ballots cast that need to be
handled is now three times as large as with conventional
(“OneBallot”) voting.
The benefit, of course, is that voters may now enjoy a
higher degree of confidence in the integrity of the voting
process and in the election results.
7 Other considerations
In this section, we list a number of other concerns and
considerations (most of which have been proposed by
readers of earlier versions of this paper—thanks!).
Inefficient use of ballot page
The ThreeBallot format can be criticized as making
inefficient use of the ballot page, compared say to tra-
ditional opscan layouts, which can use multiple columns
to handle multiple races. ThreeBallot may thus require
more ballot pages (which may lead to voter confusion).
Dependence on the checker
If the checker becomes inoperable, there is no way for
voters to proceed to vote.
Fleeing voters
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Voters are known to “escape” with ballots. With
ThreeBallot, a voter should not be allowed to escape
with just some of her ballots—she must call them all or
cast none of them. Otherwise, she is essentially discard-
ing a ballot, and could do so in a way that gives her vote
undue influence.
8 Discussion
Cryptographic techniques can also provide all of the
security properties of ThreeBallot. See Chaum [5],
Chaum et al. [6], Ryan et al. [18, 17], Karloff et al. [13],
Smith [22], and Adida [3] for presentations and discus-
sions of cryptographic voting methods.
However, ThreeBallot achieves very nearly the same
security properties, without the use of cryptography.
(ThreeBallot’s resistance for vote-buying is weaker, how-
ever.)
(I note for the record here that I have nothing against
cryptographic voting methods—indeed, I find them very
appealing. They are sometimes criticized, however, as
being difficult or impossible for the average person to
understand. (To be fair, the average person doesn’t re-
ally understand software and its security risks either!)
Thus, it is of interest to see to what extent the security
properties of cryptographic schemes, such as “end-to-
end verifiability,” can be achieved in a “low-tech” man-
ner, without using cryptography at all. The current pa-
per is an effort in this direction; it may also be a useful
starting point of study for those interested in crypto-
graphic voting methods, as it embodies many similar
principles.)
Recovery from some errors (e.g. too many ballots on
the bulletin board) can be problematic, but not more so
than with paper ballots today, in general. ThreeBallot
is really just a paper ballot scheme, with the usual issues
and remedies, except that voters cast three ballots that
were constructed in a novel manner. Rescanning the cast
paper ballots may suffice to fix many of these problems.
ThreeBallot also has pedagogic value for explaining
various aspects of verification (e.g. verifying that one’s
vote was cast as intended versus verifying that one’s vote
is actually counted as cast versus verifying that the com-
puted tally is correct), and in explaining by contrast
various cryptographic voting protocols, which are quite
similar to ThreeBallot in overall structure, but which
use different detailed mechanisms.
Note that the voter is getting not only verification that
her vote is “cast as intended” (as with most VVPAT or
paper-trail systems), but also getting evidence that her
vote is actually affecting the final tally as it should.
So, the ThreeBallot voting system seems to give a nice
level of end-to-end verifiability with “plausible” (but not
great) user interface, without using any cryptography.
One minor point regarding ThreeBallot: although all
ballots are posted on the bulletin board, political scien-
tists clearly won’t find them as interesting or useful as
they would find “real ballots” (OneBallot ballots).
9 Variations and Improvements
We have thus far presented and discussed the main ar-
chitectural components of a ThreeBallot voting scheme:
vote-by-rows but cast-by-columns, take a column copy
home as a receipt, and post all ballots on a public bul-
letin board. We have also already discussed a number of
refinements and details, having to do with ballot ID’s,
checking legality of multi-ballots, exchanging receipts,
etc. We now review a number of further variations and
extensions. I’m sure that there are nonetheless many
more ways to implement the ThreeBallot architecture
than are presented here!
9.1 Multi-ballot formats
The multi-ballot could be implemented in a number of
different ways, in addition to the two that have been dis-
cussed already (three identical columns or three identical
separate ballots). For example, you could have a first
column with the candidate names, and then three fol-
lowing columns with just bubbles to be filled in. These
last three columns are then the ballots; the first column
can be discarded, as the candidate names should be in
standard order.
9.2 Using existing opscan ballots
One could implement ThreeBallot using current opscan
ballots. The voter fills out three complete ballots, and
submits all three, keeping a copy of one. They all need
unique serial numbers, and the checker needs to scan
all three in order to do its thing. (Indeed, there is no
reason why the three ballots need to be on the same
piece of paper, as originally indicated, except for voter
convenience when filling them out...)
9.3 Using a DRE with ThreeBallot
An interesting way to implement ThreeBallot is to use
an EBM or EBP (electronic ballot marker or electronic
ballot printer). You fill out your choices on the touch
screen, and it prints out the ThreeBallot multi-ballot
(or perhaps three single ballots), plus the copy of one
ballot. (It could also print out a copy of each ballot, as
long as the voter is required to destroy two of the three
copies.)
However, the the voter still has to verify that the
printed ThreeBallot multi-ballot accurately reflects her
intentions.
Such an approach also then makes voting more acces-
sible.
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9.4 Mixing ThreeBallot with OneBallot
A conventional opscan voting system might be called
OneBallot—each voter votes just once and can’t take
away a copy of her vote cast, whereas with ThreeBallot
the voter cast three ballots, and takes away a copy of
(an arbitrarily and secretly chosen) one of those three
ballots.
You can actually mix these two systems. A OneBallot
voter can toss her ballot in the same ballot box that a
ThreeBallot voter places her three ballots in. The public
bulletin board should indicate for each voter whether
she is a OneBallot voter or a ThreeBallot voter, so that
anyone may check that the bulletin board contains the
correct number of ballots.
This provides a transitional path from OneBallot vot-
ing to ThreeBallot voting, as voters can choose which
system to use.
Counting is the same, as each voter contributes at
most one additional vote to their selected candidate
(compared to the competing candidates).
One nice feature of mixing the two systems is that the
OneBallot ballots are protected by being in the same
ballot box as the ThreeBallot ballots, since an adver-
sary will be deterred from deleting or modifying bal-
lots since they might be ThreeBallot ballots which vot-
ers have retained copies of. (OneBallot ballots must be
valid in the usual sense, without overvotes or undervotes.
But a ThreeBallot ballot might also be valid in that
sense, so an adversary would be deterred from deleting
or modifying just ballots that are valid OneBallot bal-
lots. Moreover, if OneBallot voters are also keeping re-
ceipts, as they might if they are participating in Receipt
Exchanges (Farnel protocol [8]), then the adversary is
further deterred.)
9.5 Write-In Votes
Since the voting scheme is essentially the same as with
op-scan, you can handle write-ins in the same way.
The voter must make a mark to indicate that she
wishes to specify a write-in candidate. (She does this
on exactly two of her three ballots.) On the following
blank line, she writes in the name of her desired candi-
date.
The checker should check that the same write-in can-
didate is given in both of her selected ballots (I can imag-
ine that this check could be omitted with little harm,
since the voter is then just splitting her vote. But this
is probably illegal in most states.) The checker should
also check that the write-in name is different than that
of the already listed candidate names.
The scanner can either do OCR on the write-in name,
or capture a bit-map of the written name. (There are
the obvious concerns that a voter may try to make her
vote identifiable here, so additional mechanisms may be
needed to handle write-in votes.)
9.6 Combining the checker with the
scanner
As presented, there are two scanning operations in
ThreeBallot: the multi-ballot is first scanned in the
checker, and then later the individual ballots in the bal-
lot box are scanned in order to be placed on the bulletin
board.
Can (or should?) these operations be combined? How
about a single device that not only checks the legality of
the multi-ballot and separates it into ballots, and which
produces a receipt for the voter, but which also produces
an electronic set of records for the bulletin board?
While this may be attractive from an economy point
of view, it introduces a plethora of security concerns.
I don’t think such an approach would be acceptable
unless the machine at least actually printed out three
receipts, one for each ballot, so the machine wouldn’t
know which ballots were going to be checkable by the
voter. The voter might then choose to keep one such
receipt, and discard the others. Or, the voter might keep
them all, but participate in a procedure for Exchanged
Receipts.
I would anyway want to see a strong procedure for
Exchanged Receipts used, since the machine knows in
principle which triples of ballots are linked (even though
it is not supposed to remember this). (But as noted
earlier, if we can really develop strong procedures for
Exchanging Receipts, perhaps we can just use it on a
OneBallot voting method, rather than on ThreeBallot?)
While this direction doesn’t seem necessarily unwork-
able, it isn’t obviously workable either; further elabora-
tion study is needed to see if a reasonable level of security
could be achieved.
9.7 More than Three Ballots
The scheme can easily be generalized to use more than
three ballots. For example, a voter could use five ballots,
and mark four to indicate “FOR” and three to indicate
“AGAINST”.
(In general there just needs to be a number d such that
voting “FOR” requires making d more marks in a row
than voting “AGAINST”, and such that completely
marked or completely unmarked rows are illegal.)
There is no apparent advantage to using more than
three ballots.
Using only two ballots doesn’t work, as the two ballots
would need to stay linked together in order for the tally
to be counted properly. (Note that the only potentially
usable function of the two ballots would be “exclusive-
OR”, if you want to preserve the fact that the retained
ballot copy can contain an arbitrary pattern.)
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9.8 Other Vote-Counting Methods
The ThreeBallot system works fine for “approval” vot-
ing, where each voter merely indicates, for each candi-
date, whether or not they approve of that candidate.
(Effectively, here we are merely removing the “race con-
straint” that a voter may vote “FOR” at most one can-
didate.)
ThreeBallot can be modified to support “range vot-
ing” (see Smith [21]), wherein each voter expresses a
“degree of approval” of each candidate. One could use
more than three ballots. For example, you could have
seven ballots, and require voters to make between one
and six marks in each row. Or, you can modify Three-
Ballot so that each “mark” is a number between 0 and
99, with the row constraints appropriately modified.
ThreeBallot does not work well (or at all) for vote-
counting methods such as ranked preference voting sys-
tems (such as Borda counting, IRV (instant runoff vot-
ing), or the Condorcet method) wherein voters provide
a list of all the candidates in their order of preference.
ThreeBallot also doesn’t work for straight-ticket vot-
ing (where a vote for the party implies votes for all
the party’s candidates), or other ballot situations where
there is potential interaction or contingencies between
the ballot questions.
10 Conclusion
We have presented a new voting system, ThreeBallot,
that provides a high degree of verifiability—voters can
verify that their votes are cast as intended, and can check
that their vote is included in the final tally. All cast
ballots are published, and tampering with votes can be
detected.
This is the first time such end-to-end verifiability has
been obtained without the use of cryptographic tech-
niques. The principles employed by ThreeBallot are sim-
ple and easy to understand.
However, ThreeBallot’s resistance to vote-buying is
not as strong as I had hoped; perhaps some improvement
in this regard can be found.
I encourage the reader to send me feedback, and to
develop further improvements, extensions, and imple-
mentations of ThreeBallot.∗
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